Using a real-time random regime shift technique, we identify and discuss two different regimes in the dynamics of credit spreads during 2002-2012: a liquidity regime and a default regime. Both regimes contribute to the patterns observed in credit spreads. The liquidity regime seems to explain the predictive power of credit risk on the 2007-2009 NBER recession, whereas the default regime drives the persistence of credit spreads over the same recession. Our results complement the recent dynamic structural models as well as monetary and credit supply effects models by empirically supporting two important patterns in credit spreads: the persistence and the predictive ability toward economic downturns.
I. Introduction
Nonetheless, the observed patterns of the credit cycle have to be explained using its main two drivers: the default cycle and the liquidity cycle. It would be interesting to know how these cycles behave during periods of financial distress and recession. Specifically, our main objective is to explain regime shifts in the credit risk factor of bond spreads by thoroughly analyzing these shifts in the default factor and in the liquidity factor. 1 Maalaoui Chun, Dionne and François (2013) show that corporate bond spreads describe a long-lasting level regime that contains but outlasts NBER recessions. They also argue that regime shifts (especially for high-yield bonds with short maturities) are often detected before the effective starting date of the NBER economic recession. An important component in the credit regime stems from high default premiums observed during recessions. The empirical evidence also suggests that credit regimes contain a factor that qualifies as a forward-looking measure of financial and economic downturns.
In addition, the authors link their credit regimes to two economic indicators: the Senior Loan Officer Opinion (SLO) Survey, which captures capital market liquidity, and the Fed fund rate, which captures the state of monetary policy. The detected credit regime is almost always affected by credit supply effects but has feedback effects with monetary policy actions. Thus, the dynamics of the credit regime may result from changing liquidity conditions in the bond market.
Longstaff, Schaefer, and Strebulaev (2011) find that, since the railroad crisis in 1873-1875, historical patterns of default have constituted important economic phenomena that often repeat themselves. Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005, LMN) support the idea that the default risk is the most important part of the corporate credit spread, using data before the financial crisis (2000) (2001) . However, Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter, and Lando (2012, DFL) reach a different conclusion for the recent subprime crisis. They argue that since the onset of the subprime crisis, most of the credit spread has been due to the illiquidity of the bond market.
This confirms the need to re-examine the relationship between default and liquidity risk in the bond market by modeling these risks distinctly and linking them to the credit risk premium (Han and Zhou, 2008) . 1 Saunders and Allen (2010) , and Bernanke (2013) address this question without a formal analysis.
We estimate the default risk of corporate bonds using information from credit default swap (CDS) contracts. The CDS contracts have the advantage of being more liquid than corporate bonds and thus embed new information concerning changes in the creditworthiness of the issuer more efficiently. 2 Thus, a CDS premium is a timely reflector of the credit worthiness of the firm that issued the bond. Further, given that CDS are contracts rather than securities, the premium of a CDS contract is much less sensitive to effects of liquidity and market risks and effects of convenience yield than are corporate bond prices. Thus, CDS contracts are attractive from the point of view of estimating default risk. We closely follow LMN in constructing the individual default risk measure for each firm in our sample. (2013) we also analyze the whole term structure of CDS contracts for each firm when filtering out the firm-specific default risk measure.
To measure the liquidity premium we use the most comprehensive source of high frequency bond transactions provided by TRACE. We follow Han and Zhou (2008) and DickNielsen, Feldhutter, and Lando (2012) Regarding the default risk regimes, an important regime shift occurred in June 2008, well after the beginning of both the financial crisis and the NBER recession starting date. The persistence of the default risk factor following both periods is much stronger than the persistence of the liquidity risk factor, which is in line with results found in the recent theoretical literature on dynamic structural default risk models (Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec, 2006;  Chen, 2010; and Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev, 2010). Our results also support monetary 2 Detailed discussions on the differences between CDS premiums and corporate bond spreads can be found in Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) and Lando (2004) . and credit supply effects models of Bhamra, Fisher and Kuehn (2011), Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , King(1994) , and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the credit risk literature by emphasizing two major components of credit risk -default risk and liquidity risk. Section III briefly outlines the model used to extract default risk from the information in CDS contracts. It also outlines the model used to measure liquidity risk and the regime shift detection technique. Section IV describes the TRACE data for bond transactions as well as the Markit data that includes all North American Financial CDS data for CDS contracts.
Section V presents the results. Section VI concludes the paper. Technical details are reported in the Appendix.
II. Literature review

II.1 Credit risk models
Credit risk in this paper is referred to as the yield spread, i.e. the difference between the yield of a defaultable bond and the yield of the government bond with the same maturitiy (Duffee, 1998) . This difference, also called a credit spread in the literature, measures the risk premium associated with the credit risk. This means that corporate bond investors ask for a higher yield on a corporate bond because they are exposed to additional risks and costs that do not affect a government bond (or any other equivalent benchmark; see for instance Hull et al., 2004) . We assume that the government bond yield does not contain any premium related to currency devaluation, public debt or public deficit and liquidity (Ejsing, Grothe and Grothe, 2012) . In other words, we do not cover the risk of sovereign debt. However, bonds issued by firms, financial institutions and the government can all be affected by market risk (Fama and French, 1993) . from an investment perspective because corporate debt is one of the largest asset classes in financial markets (Longstaff et al., 2005) . They are also important from a macroeconomic point of view because yield spreads are closely linked to business and monetary cycles. If credit spreads predict business cycles, it would be interesting to determine which its components is driving this predictive power. Finally, during the recent financial crisis, liquidity risk became important, especially in the banking industry. During that period, liquidity risk was significant for many financial assets (such as asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) in Canada), and central banks had to use special policy measures to inject liquidity into the financial system. Finally, the new international regulatory framework for banks (Basel III, 2010) emphasizes the role of liquidity risk in computing regulatory capital.
Since the beginning of the 2000s, the finance literature has distinguished between default risk and credit risk. Default risk is the risk that a bond issuer will not be able to pay the agreed coupons and principal during the life of the corporate bond. Default risk contains three main elements: 1) the probability of default (PD) and the related bond rating migration (BRM); 2) the expected value of the bond at default (EAD); and 3) the loss given default (LGD), which is the fraction of EAD that will not be recovered by the bondholder after default.
Before the 2000s, credit risk was considered as synonym to default risk. Yet, research has shown that credit risk cannot be explained only by historical default related variables.
The default risk represents only a fraction of corporate credit spread which instantaneously represent the premium according to structural models. Even by adding additional candidates further suggested by more recent structural models, the literature has been able to explain around 25% to 85% of the yield spread, depending on the bond rating, the period considered, the nature of the data available, and the set of factors considered including the business Liquidity risk has been documented as one of the important determinants of corporate bond credit spreads (e.g. Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis, 2005 ). Yet, the lack of transaction bond data necessary to measure this risk limited the empirical support of this hypothesis.
During the recent financial crisis many structured financial products such as asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO) became highly illiquid supporting the idea that liquidity risk is an important risk in the credit market.
The macroeconomic risk factor is also an important determinant of credit spread. A statistical link between business cycles and credit spread levels and volatility has been observed, however the causality between the business cycle and the credit cycle is not well established.
For instance, as documented by Maalaoui- Chun, et al (2013) , and Ng, (2013) , there is no perfect concordance between business cycles and credit cycles. Credit cycles last often longer than business cycles. When recessions officially end, corporate yield spreads remain high for many months, meaning there is persistence in credit cycles. More importantly, because corporate bond spreads start to increase before economic recessions they can even be viewed as predictors of recessions.
Early contributions on decomposing credit spreads have been limited by the availability of bond data. Today, detailed data on bond transactions at high frequency become available.
In addition, a larger set of credit derivatives is traded actively in financial markets providing researchers with alternative data sources to examine the dynamics of corporate yield spreads more closely. LMN (2005) use information on credit default swaps (CDS) to separate the relative sizes of default and non-default components in corporate yield spreads. They assume that the CDS premium is an appropriate measure of default risk. A CDS is like an insurance contract that compensates the investor for losses arising from the default of a corporate bond. In such contracts, the owner of a corporate bond is the party buying protection by paying the seller of a CDS (usually an investment bank or an insurer) a fixed premium each period (usually a quarter) until either the bond defaults or the swap contract matures. In return, if the underlying firm defaults on its debt, the protection seller is obliged to buy the defaulted bond back from the CDS buyer at its par value. The protection seller usually loses a fraction (LGD) of the par value of the defaulting bond. 3 LMN (2005) find that more than fifty percent of corporate yield spread is due to default risk. This result holds for all studied rating categories and is robust to the definition of the riskless curve. In particular, using credit spreads over Treasury yields, the default component represents 51% of the spread for AAA and AA rated bonds, 56% for A-rated bonds, 71% for BBB-rated bonds, and 83% for BB-rated bonds. These results contrast with those in Elton et default risk. The main conclusion in DFL work is that liquidity risk become very important after the subprime crisis especially for investment grade bonds. For speculative grade bonds, the total spread explained by liquidity risk was 24% during the pre-subprime period and 23% during the post-subprime crisis. However, for investment grade bonds, the ratio increased significantly between the two periods ranging from 3% to 8% during the pre-subprime period (according to the ratings) to 23% to 42% during the post-subprime crisis. The exception is AAA bonds, which varied from 3% to 7% between the two periods. They attribute this exception to a fly-to-quality phenomenon. They also obtained different results when considering bonds with different maturities with the largest variations between the pre and post subprime observed for bonds with 10 to 30 years of maturity.
DFL also looked at the effect of the nature of the bond underwriter and the industry origin on bond illiquidity. Specifically, they analyzed the illiquidity of bonds underwritten by Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers and compared them with the illiquidity of bonds underwritten by other banks. They found a small effect for Bear Stearns, which was acquired by J.P.
Morgan. However, they document a big jump in the illiquidity index of bonds underwritten by Lehman Brothers during the period around the default of the bank followed by some persistence after the bankruptcy date (September 15, 2008) . By comparing the illiquidity index of bonds of industrial firms with the index of bonds of financial firms, they find that bonds of financial firms were more liquid before the onset of the financial crisis in July 2007 and became less liquid after that date. In conclusion, these authors observed that bond spreads increased considerably during the financial crisis and found that bond illiquidity contributed significantly to that widening. Many regulatory failures accelerated the crisis. The rollover of ABCP, issued by Special Investment Vehicles, was supposed to be financed and guaranteed by commercial banks. However, such guaranties did not exist because they were not required by the regulation. In fact, many ABCP issues were not adequately documented (Chant, 2008 (Chant, , 2013 . Moreover, during the crisis, banks sustained severe losses and the market value of their equity collapsed.
These banks continued to pay dividends instead of keeping capital because, according to the regulatory standards, they were well capitalized (Acharya, 2013) .
Banks were rapidly exposed to liquidity risks during the financial crisis (Acharya et al 5 Stulz (2010) reviews the role of CDSs during the financial crisis. Allen et al, (2011) show that during the crisis, there was no variation in short-term spreads for Canadian financial institutions, although the 5-year CDS spreads varied substantially during the same period. They conclude that CDSs may not be appropriate instruments for providing information in very short periods of time. 
III. Models
In this section we present three models that will be used to decompose credit spread shifts into default shifts and liquidity shifts during the 2002-2012 period. We first present the default spread model where the spread is measured by the CDS premium of the corporate bonds, as 
III.1 The default premium of the debt issuer
Default risk is the risk of reduction in bond market value caused by changes in the quality of bond issuers. This risk represents the fraction of the change in corporate bond yield spread associated with default risk. This fraction can be measured by the CDS premium on a corporate bond. 6 A CDS is a financial instrument that provides insurance against the default of a reference security (the bond) or the reference credit (the issuer of the bond). A simple illustration of the CDS contract involves a protection buyer (the buyer of CDS protection) and a protection seller (the seller of CDS protection). The protection buyer buys protection against the default of the reference bond or of its issuer by taking a long position on the CDS contract. The protection buyer pays a periodic CDS premium to the protection seller until either the default of the reference entity occurs or the CDS contract reaches maturity. 7 If default of the reference entity occurs before the maturity of the CDS contract, the protection seller buys the defaulted bond from the protection buyer at its face value. As noted by LMN in practice it is very common to assume that the CDS premium equals the default component of the bond issuer's credit spread. 8 Using the reduced-form approach developed by Singleton (1999, 2003) , we represent the firm-specific intensity of default implied by the observed premium in a CDS contract.
The risk-neutral default intensity of the corporate bond follows a square-root diffusion (Cox-Ingersoll-Ross, 1985, CIR) process :
where i is the intensity of the Poisson process governing the default of the reference issue i; Z i is a standard Brownian motion, and i ; i ; i are CIR parameters capturing the dynamics of the default intensity of the reference issue i. We follow Chun and Yu (2013) and use the Kalman Filter approach to infer for each reference issue i the CIR parameters corresponding to the whole observed term structure of CDS premia. 9 We assume that the default-free interest rate that we denote r t is independent of i t . As documented in LMN, this assumption has little effect on the empirical results, and it greatly simplifies the model. Suppose firm i may default at time i . Thus, at this time i ; the bondholder recovers a fraction (1 w i ) of the par 6 Another method of measuring default risk is to compute its components (default probability (DP), exposure at default, (EAD) and loss given default (LGD)) directly by using bond data (Elton et al, 2001; Lando et al, 2002; Dionne et al, 2010) . 7 The International Swaps and Derivatives Association has defined six credit events that trigger settlement under the CDS contract. These events include bankruptcy of the reference entity, failure to pay interest or principal when due, debt restructuring unfavorably affecting the credit holder, obligation default, obligation acceleration, and repudiation/moratorium. 8 We do not consider counterparty risk of CDS writers although some of them had solvency problems during the recent financial crisis. Since we are mainly interested in the study of regime shifts, this should not affect our results significantly. 9 See Duan and Simonato (2004) for more details on the use of the Kalman Filter.
value of the bond. Suppose the protection buyer makes quarterly payments of s i s i 4 on the CDS at times 0; t 1 ; ; t n until the maturity of the contract or the default event, whichever comes first. Thus, we can write the present value of the premium leg of the CDS P (s i ; T ) as follows:
The independence assumption between r t and i t allows us to rewrite Equation (2) as:
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where D (t i ) is the discount factor, i.e. the price of a nondefaultable zero-coupon bond with maturity t i and face value of $1. In case of default at time i , the recovery on the reference entity per unit of par value is (1 w i ) so that the protection seller pays w i in default. The value of the protection leg can then be expressed as follows:
where 1 is the default indicator. Following LMN, we rewrite Equation (3) and Equation (4) in terms of the diffusion parameters in Equation (1) . It follows that:
, and H i (t i ) are expressed in terms of the CIR parameters ( i ; i ; i )
in Equation (1) and their functions A, B, G, H are given in the Appendix.
Given that the CDS contract has zero net value at inception, we can express the CDS premium s i in terms of the default intensity i 0 by equating the values of the two legs in the CDS contract
where all parameters are as defined above. 10 The expression in (6) allows us to estimate the firm specific default intensity i 0 using the whole term structure of observed CDS premia.
III.2 The liquidity premium of the issuer
The literature maintains that the concept of liquidity has several dimensions, which cannot be summarized using a single measure of illiquidity. We follow DFL and construct the eight illiquidity measures defined in their study and use principal component analysis to specify a common illiquidity factor that will be used to approximate the liquidity premium of corporate bonds. 11
The Amihud illiquidity measure This measure is defined by Amihud (2002) as the average ratio of the daily absolute return to the dollar daily trading volume. It characterizes the daily price impact of the order flow, i.e., the price change per dollar of daily trading volume.
For each individual bond i, we compute the daily Amihud measure as follows:
where N t is the number of returns in each day t, P i j;t (in $ of $100 par) denotes the jth transaction price of bond i in day t and Q i j;t (in $ million) the jth trading volume of bond i in day t. This measure reflects how much prices move due to a given value of a trade. Thus, a very illiquid bond would have a very high Amihud measure. To construct the Amihud daily measures, we first apply the Han and Zhou (2008) filters. Specifically, we exclude transaction prices less than $1 and higher than $500. We exclude prices that are 20% higher than the median price of the same day or the previous day. We also exclude prices that are 20% lower than the median price of the same day or the previous day. After applying this filter, we verify that we have at least three transactions for each bond to obtain the daily Amihud measure.
To obtain the monthly measures we take the median of daily measures. 
The Imputed Roundtrip Cost
where P denotes changes in transaction prices. The daily Roll measure is calculated using a rolling window of 21 trading days with at least four transactions in the window to be sure the measure is well-defined.
The average holding time of a bond We measure trading intensity using the daily turnover:
turnover t = total trading volume t amount outstanding
The turnover captures the trading intensity, which specifies assets that trade more frequently and thus are more liquid. The inverse of turnover (turnover t ) can be interpreted as 12 The Roll measure is based on the assumption of market efficiency. It also assumes that the probability distribution of observed price changes within a very short period is stationary (i.e. two months). the average holding time of a bond, which is another measure of illiquidity.
Bond's zero trading days Another measure of non trading intensity is the ratio of the number of zero trading days over the total number of days during a period. Thus, a higher ratio indicates that the corporate bond is less liquid. We obtain the daily zero-trading days measure using a rolling window of 21 trading days. bond zero t = number of bond zero trades within the rolling window number of days in the rolling window (11)
Firm's zero trading days Another measure of non-trading intensity is the firm's zero trading days, which counts the days in which none of the firm bond issues is traded in that day.
Similar to the bond zero trades measure, we obtain the daily firm zero trades measure using a rolling window of 21 trading days.
firm zero t = number of firm bonds zero trades within the rolling window number of days in the rolling window (12)
The liquidity premium We construct a liquidity premium using the relevant loadings obtained from principal component analysis of the above illiquidity definitions. Specifically, the liquidity premium (or illiquidity factor) is a linear combination of illiquidity loads obtained from principal component analysis. We define each measure as l j it ; where i defines the corporate bond, t defines the day, and j defines the liquidity definition. Each measure is then normalized and leads to l ; with j and j defining the mean and the volatility of the liquidity measure j across the different bonds and days. Finally, we define the daily measure of the bond specific illiquidity factor as a linear combination of the normalized illiquidity measures.
where J is the number of liquidity measures that will be retained from the principal component analysis.
III.3 Default and liquidity regime detection
The econometrics literature on structural changes provides a wide range of techniques for detecting break dates in time series. 13 In this article we use the technique of Maalaoui Chun, et al (2013), which has the advantage of detecting possible break points in real time or when new data arrives. The non-parametric technique is a data-driven analysis in that it detects random regime shifts and can be classified among random regime models. It does not require 13 See for instance Gordon any a priori assumptions about the timing or the number of detected regimes, and it does not require the regime to switch back to its previous level. Another feature of this technique is its ability to detect economic shocks affecting the level and the volatility of time series distinctly from one another. We can thus detect new regimes in the data and attempt to link these regimes to economic phenomena that remain unexplained.
Consider that data on a risk premium is represented by the following time series fY t ; t = 1; :::; ng. Suppose Y t is described by an autoregressive model:
where f t captures a potentially time-varying mean, is the autocorrelation coefficient, and
. If time t = c is a breakpoint where the distribution of the data changes, then the mean level f t can be expressed as: 
where the null hypothesis for a shift at time c is performed using a two-sample t-test. The presence of a positive autocorrelation coefficient in equation (14), can generate false regime detections in the data. When the underlying data contain a stationary first-order autoregressive process with a positive autocorrelation coefficient, such a process is known as a red noise process. Thus, the removal of red noise, which involves estimating the AR(1) coefficient, is an important preliminary step that facilitates the accurate detection of regime shifts in the data.
After the AR(1) coefficient is accurately estimated and the red noise is removed, the filtered time series is then processed with the regime shift detection method. (See Maalaoui Chun et al., 2013, for more details).
To detect a level regime, we start by defining the sample mean Z cur of the first sequence of the data of length m. 14 Let be the difference between the mean values of two subsequent sequences that would be statistically significant at the level mean according to the Student t-test:
where m is the initial cut-off length of regimes similar to the cut-off point in low-pass filtering, s 2 m is the sample variance, and t 2m 2 mean is the value of the two-tailed t-distribution with (2m 2)
degrees of freedom at the given probability level mean . During the test, the sample mean of the current regime Z cur is known but the mean value of the new regime Z new is unknown:
The shift in the level occurs if the current value tested Z cur is outside the critical threshold 14 We previously check that the filtered data do not suffer from statistical issues related to the distribution of the data in each regime, heteroskedasticity of the residuals and square residuals. These issues are further discussed in Maalaoui Chun et al (2013) .
where Z " crit is the critical mean if the shift is upward and Z # crit is the critical mean if the shift is downward. However, if the current value Z cur is inside the range
, then we reject the null for a shift at t cur and we conclude that the current regime has not changed.
In this case, the value Z cur is included in the current regime and the test continues with the next value. However, if the current value Z cur is greater than Z " crit or less than Z # crit , the time t cur is marked as a potential change point and the subsequent data are used to confirm or reject this hypothesis using the Regime Shift Index (RSI) that represents a cumulative sum of normalized anomalies relative to the critical mean Z crit :
If at any time during the testing period from t cur to t cur + m 1 the RSI turns negative
crit or positive when Z crit = Z # crit , the null hypothesis for a shift at t cur is rejected. We include the value Z cur in the current regime and continue the test with the next value at t cur = t m + 2. Otherwise, time t cur is declared a change point and is significant at least at the confidence level mean : The subsequent regime then becomes the current regime and the test continues with the new data point.
IV. Data
In this research we use two main data sets.
The TRACE database: This database became available only in July 2002. The TRACE database reports high frequency data and contains information about almost all trades in the secondary over-the-counter market for corporate bonds, accounting for 99% of the total trading volume. Our data from TRACE cover the period from July 2002 to December 2012. 15 We employ the filter proposed by Dick-Nielsen (2009) to correct for reporting errors, which are shown to include a substantial bias in liquidity measures to reflect a more liquid bond market. 16 In addition, as Dick-Nielsen (2009) noted, duplicates of the so-called agency transactions may introduce a downward bias in the Turnover measure when compared with the values reported in the FINRA TRACE fact book. Given that we use Turnover in our liquidity 15 Although the full dissemination of bond transaction prices is completed in October 2004, we include transaction prices before that date if we can match the bond with a CDS contract. 16 For instance, Dick-Nielsen (2009) shows that the magnitude of the median error ranges between 7.4% and 14.6% respectively for the average daily turnover and the quarterly Amihud measure. measures, we also filter out agency transaction duplicates.
The CDS database: Data for CDS contracts are obtained from Markit. We thus have a rich dataset on CDS spreads for a wide range of firms and banks and over the entire term structure. Maturities are from 6 months to 10 years. The data have a daily frequency and cover the period from 2002 to 2012. We use the whole term structure to extract the -intensity of each issuer. Trading days are defined by the time schedule of the NYSE. Figure 1 reports the evolution of credit spreads from January 2007 to April 2009. It also indicates the main developments associated with the financial crisis during that period. 17 We note the three periods of the financial crisis identified by Saunders and Allen (2010) 
V. Estimation results and discussion
V.1 Statistics for credit risk
V.2 Credit risk regimes
For our regime detection, we use an initial cut-off length of six data points (m = 6), and a Huber parameter of two (h = 2) which controls for outliers in credit spreads series. We also prewhitened the data before applying the regime detection technique to reduce the possibility of detecting false regimes. All the detected regimes are significant at least at the 95% confidence level ( = 0:05). Shift points for credit spreads are reported in Table 1 , Panel A and can be summarized as follows.
[Insert Table 1 (Figure 3, Panel B) . To understand the origins of these two aspects in the data, we break down these credit risk shifts into default and liquidity regime shifts. This allows us to obtain a more detailed interpretation of the driving forces of both crises.
[Insert Figure 3 about here] Table 2 reports summary statistics for the daily CDS premiums of different maturities (6 months to 10 years), the recovery rates (1 w i ) , and the corresponding credit spreads (CS).
V.3 Statistics and detection of default risk regimes
[Insert Table 2 does not seem to have affected these default premiums significantly. The variation in premiums may be related to the default risk of these institutions, and their relative value seems to support that observation. It is interesting to observe that the premiums of JP Morgan are much lower than those of the other institutions, and those of AIG were particularly high at the end of the recession period even after it was rescued by the US Government.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
We illustrate the dynamics of the default risk factor from January 2001 to December 2012 in Figure 5 . We plot the default factor obtained as an average of the Q-intensity of default obtained from our CDS data of all the firms in our sample for which CDS products were sold (129 firms including the six institutions in Figure 4 and a Huber parameter of two (h = 2) after prewhitening the data on the default factor. All the detected regimes are significant at least at the 95% confidence level ( = 0:05).
Both the statistics of the Q-intensity factor and the level default regime clearly indicate that default risk was not important before June 2008. Interestingly, the first positive shift we detect is in June 2008 as shown in Table 1 [Insert Figure 5 about here] Table 4 . We use the results of this first principal component to construct our measure for the liquidity factor. Specifically, the liquidity factor is obtained as the average of the IRC, the IRC risk, and the Roll measures.
V.4 Statistics and detection of liquidity risk regimes
[Insert Table 5 about here] As for the default factor, we apply the regime detection technique to the liquidity factor.
We also use an initial cut-off length of six data points (m = 6) and a Huber parameter of two (h = 2) after prewhitening the data on the liquidity factor. Results of the liquidity regime are illustrated in Figure 7 All the detected regimes are significant at least at the 95% confidence level ( = 0:05). We report the detected shift points in Table 1 
I VI. Conclusion
This paper analyzes credit risk regimes in the corporate bond market during the period 2002-2012 that includes the last financial crisis and the last NBER recession. Our goal is to explain the sources of corporate bond regime shifts by analyzing two of their components in detail: default and liquidity regime shifts.
By superimposing credit regimes on liquidity regimes and default regimes, we link, contrast and discuss the most important credit-related cycles in the bond market and study their behavior at the onset of economic recessions. Our analysis highlights the nature of the credit regime component, which serves as a forward-looking measure of financial and economic downturns. Specifically, we document the question of whether it is possible to attribute this characteristic of credit spreads to predict economic recessions to a shift in the liquidity risk or a shift in the default risk of the bond market. Our results offer new insights into developing dynamic structural equilibrium models for credit risk as well as for modeling the empirical dynamics of the credit risk premium. To our knowledge, no previous work has directly linked the credit regime to both default and liquidity regimes. Regarding the default risk regimes, an important regime shift occurred in June 2008, well after the beginning of both the financial crisis and NBER recession starting dates. Yet the persistence effect of the default risk factor after both periods seems much stronger than the persistence effect of the liquidity risk factor, which is consistent with the recent theoretical literature on dynamics structural default risk models.
These preliminary results are very encouraging. They indicate that our new regime shift detection methodology adequately captures the shifts in credit, default and liquidity risks.
They also show that rating and pricing models of corporate bonds must integrate a liquidity factor in their analysis, and not only a default factor. Finally they confirm the objective of Basel III to include liquidity risk in the computation of regulatory capital Many extensions of our analysis are worth doing. We consider four of them here. First, it would be interesting to know the proportions of default risk and liquidity risks in the total yield spread. The recent paper by Dick-Nielse, Feldhütter and Lando (2012) 
Then , the value of the premium leg can be expressed as follows:
and, the value of the protection leg can be expressed as follows:
where D (t i ) is the discount factor, (1 w i ) is the recovery on the reference entity per unit of par value, 1 is the default indicator, and A (t) ; B (t) ; G (t) ; H (t) ; are funtions of the CIR parameters ( ; ; ) : ; and = q 2 2 + 2 ; = + :
Note that H (t) = A (t) B 0 (t) and G (t) = A 0 (t). We report the results of the regime shift detection technique applied to the level of 1) the (average) credit spreads (Panel A), 2) the default factor (Panel B) , and 3) the liquidity factor (Panel C). The initial cut-off length is 6 months, the Huber parameter is 2, and all detected regimes are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level or higher. The sign of the Regime Shift Index (RSI sign) provides the direction of detected shifts. Regime means are expressed in percentages and regime lengths in months. 
